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7. We’ll Always Have Paris
Mike Hannis
Many were rightly sceptical of the Paris Agreement’s 
choreographed performance of success, given its reliance 
on theoretical carbon trading, fantastical Negative Emission 
Technologies (NETs), and voluntary national ‘contributions’. 
But was COP21 the high-water mark of climate co-operation? 
Can COP26 rekindle the internationalist spirit required to keep 
even the idea of a globally co-ordinated effort alive, in the face of 
resurgent nationalism and the proliferation of apparently more 
immediate crises? This article explores the chances of COP26 
reinvigorating international co-operation, and with it the flagging 
credibility of the whole Paris process. It focuses in particular on 
the Paris Agreement’s controversial Article 6 rules on voluntary 
carbon trading, and the urgent need to prevent emissions traded 
across international borders from counting towards Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs).
All Eyes on Paris1
For a few weeks in late 2015, all eyes were on Paris. High-level delegates 
from almost every country on Earth attended the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—more snappily known as COP21, or the Paris 
Climate Conference. Civil society and media swarmed in too. There are 
subsidiary climate COPs every year, but major ones follow a five-year 
cycle, making COP26 in Glasgow the next ‘last chance to save the world’.
1 Parts of this chapter were first published in The Land magazine, 27 (2020), 18–20; 28 
(2021), 4.
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Before Paris, 2009’s COP15 in Denmark had failed to live up to 
its ill-advised branding as Hopenhagen. A tentative goal of limiting 
temperature increases to two degrees above pre-industrial levels was 
agreed, subject to review in 2015, but no progress was made on any 
practical steps towards actually achieving this, or towards any kind of 
legally binding agreement.
2015’s COP21 in Paris did see a genuine breakthrough. This was 
achieved, however, by abandoning attempts to create a legally binding 
system, and instead adopting the voluntary Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 
2015). The Agreement upheld the below 2℃ warming target, and 
even added an aspiration to keep warming within 1.5 degrees. Each 
Party (UNFCCC member states, plus the EU) agreed to set out its 
planned reductions in emissions, now termed Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). Reviewed every five years, NDCs can be 
amended to be ‘more ambitious’, but are never supposed to be revised 
downwards. This review process is intended to ‘ratchet up’ commitment 
to emissions reduction, but detailed discussion of how the new system 
would actually work in practice was deferred.
Before diaries were ripped up by the COVID-19 pandemic, COP26 
was scheduled for November 2020. In time for this Glasgow meeting, 
Parties had been asked to set long-term decarbonisation goals, as 
well as to undertake the first five-yearly review of their shorter-term 
NDCs (Gabbatiss 2021). This process was to be governed by a ‘Paris 
rulebook’, details of which were intended to have been agreed and 
finalised in advance of COP26. These rules are supposed to make NDCs 
transparent, fair and robust by ensuring that all countries calculate 
them using agreed common methodologies, rather than doing the 
sums in whatever way works to their advantage. Standardisation would 
also allow the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and others to plausibly translate the aggregated NDCs into global 
temperature change forecasts.
Carbon Trading Rules
Intermediate COPs since Paris largely saw fudges and grandstanding 
rather than real progress, but nonetheless the Paris rulebook was mostly 
agreed by the end of COP24 (held in Katowice, Poland in 2018), albeit 
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with the significant exception of rules on voluntary carbon trading. 
These are known as Article 6 rules, after the somewhat obscure but 
critically important part of the Paris Agreement they relate to (UNFCCC 
2015: 4–5). 
This trading issue is significant. The Paris Agreement explicitly 
allows countries calculating their NDCs to include emissions reductions 
elsewhere over which they have somehow gained ‘ownership’, as well 
as those actually achieved within their own territory. In so doing, it 
arguably makes voluntary carbon trading a more prominent mechanism 
for delivering emissions reductions than it ought to be. For clarity, the 
relevant UNFCCC COP21 Agreement Article 6 rules are as follows:
Article 6
1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary 
cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined 
contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and 
adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and 
environmental integrity. 
2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative 
approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote 
sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and 
transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting 
to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with 
guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Agreement.
3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve 
nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be 
voluntary and authorized by participating Parties. 
4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established 
under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use by Parties 
on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement, and shall aim: 
(a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while 
fostering sustainable development; 
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(b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by 
a Party; 
(c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, 
which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission 
reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally 
determined contribution; 
and (d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions. 
5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in 
paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement 
of the host Party’s nationally determined contribution if used by 
another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined 
contribution (UNFCCC 2015: 4–5). 
The voluntary carbon trading framework established by Article 6 
risks legitimising a wide range of questionable practices whereby 
richer countries offset their polluting activities by paying for allegedly 
emission-reducing or carbon-capturing activities in poorer ones. For 
instance, if the Norwegian government pays for some reforestation in 
Indonesia, or a British company pays to install a scrubber to remove 
potential carbon emissions from the chimney of a chemical plant in 
India, the resulting greenhouse gas reductions will be reported as part 
of the Norwegian or British NDCs (as provided for in Article 6.5). 
One problem immediately arising here is that the ‘host Party’, in this 
example Indonesia or India, might also want to report the resulting 
reductions in their own NDC. 
Article 6 is clear that such double counting would not be allowed (see 
6.2 and 6.5 above), which at first sight seems fair. But is it? Should the 
host really have to also identify and enact a second set of reductions which 
will count towards its own target? Would this not mean it was taking on 
a disproportionate share of the overall work? This kind of argument has 
been forcefully put, for example by Brazilian delegates concerned with 
retaining sovereignty over the Amazon Forest, but also by consultants 
(e.g. Streck 2020) whose creative interpretation of what constitutes 
double counting relies on the idea that private sector voluntary trading 
schemes (as opposed to government actions) should not be counted as 
part of NDCs. This apparently technical dispute masks a bitter standoff 
between countries hoping to offset their own activities by, for example, 
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funding preservation of the Amazon through carbon offset purchases, 
and a Brazilian government insisting on full sovereignty over the area’s 
resources. Neither is on the side of the angels.2
OMG(E)!
There are also tricky practical questions about standards and 
verification. Who is supposed to make sure that any given scheme is 
not counted twice? How exactly might this be done? The answer may 
well be different for bilateral deals between two countries (covered 
by Article 6.2), and for trades undertaken within the regulated global 
carbon trading market mechanism envisaged by Article 6.4, but neither 
is clear.
The latter mechanism is intended to supersede the earlier Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), a dysfunctional voluntary trading 
scheme established by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC. Some 
countries hold vast numbers of old CDM credits, and have argued that 
they should be able to count these against future NDCs. In the case of 
Australia, cashing in these CDM credits would at a stroke have achieved 
(on paper) more than half the emissions cuts required to meet its NDC 
target of reducing emissions to 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2030. One 
Australian economist has described this situation as “tantamount to 
a drunk guy waving an expired Starbucks coffee voucher around in a 
McDonald’s and acting surprised that nobody wanted to give him a 
coffee” (Denniss 2020). In the face of such ridicule this strategy was 
eventually dropped (Doherty 2020).
The overarching issue here is whether voluntary trading actually 
results in ‘Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions’ (OMGE), meaning 
a genuine net reduction, rather than just serving as a way for emissions 
in one place to be offset elsewhere, thereby allowing business-as-usual 
to continue (as also foregrounded in Lankford’s discussion in this 
2 This summary of post-Paris COP negotiations is largely derived from comprehensive 
coverage at www.carbonbrief.org. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015: 
4–5) addresses “[voluntary] use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
[ITMOs] to achieve nationally determined contributions”: for background, see 
https://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/en/introduction/the-paris-agreement-and-
article-6. For an insider account of the recent bilateral agreement claimed to be 
“the first instrument that provides access to the voluntary carbon market to ITMOs 
under the provisions of the Paris Agreement”, see Elgart and Secada 2020.
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volume regarding the necessity and difficulty of securing permanent 
CO2 ‘salvage’, and in Dyke et al.’s chapter on the difficulties of achieving 
net zero emissions overall). 
This issue was discussed at the Paris COP, and while detail is lacking, 
the principle of OMGE is acknowledged in Article 6.4 as an objective 
of the proposed global trading scheme. Worryingly, however, no such 
objective is included in Article 6.2 on bilateral trading, although this 
Article does explicitly mention the need to avoid “double accounting” of 
emissions reductions. As things stand there appears to be no watertight 
obligation to ensure that any given offsetting transaction between two 
countries actually results in a net emissions reduction. It has been 
largely left to the Association of Small Island States, whose territories 
are already literally disappearing under the waves, to point out how 
disastrous this could be (Dizzanne 2019).
COP25 (held in Madrid in 2019) was supposed to see all these 
arguments settled. To the dismay of many but the surprise of few, 
once again this did not happen. Newly minted climate celebrity Greta 
Thunberg captured the mood when she told a restive plenary hall that 
the COP seemed to have “turned into some kind of opportunity for 
countries to negotiate loopholes” (Evans and Gabbatis 2019: online). 
The lamentable failure to agree Article 6 rules before COP26 means that 
the five-yearly review of NDCs is happening without agreement on 
crucial elements of what these can or cannot contain. This raises a real 
danger that Parties’ emissions reductions may be inflated beyond what 
has actually been achieved, meaning that the world is even further from 
achieving ‘net zero carbon’ than reported figures suggest. 
Better Late than on Time?
Quite apart from the sorry outcome of preparatory negotiations, there 
was widespread relief that COP26 did not have to take place against 
the backdrop of the US’s formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
which came into effect on 4 November 2020, just before the original 
Glasgow dates. Trump’s contrarian refusal to co-operate on climate had 
of course been an elephant in every COP negotiating room since 2017. 
The incoming Biden administration wasted no time in rejoining the Paris 
Agreement, and has submitted a relatively ambitious NDC promising 
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a 50–52% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 from a 2005 
baseline, alongside goals to create a “carbon pollution-free power sector 
by 2035” and a “net zero greenhouse gas emissions economy by no 
later than 2050” (White House 2021: online). Nonetheless while US 
re-engagement provides a much-needed boost to the flagging credibility 
of the whole Paris process, there are several lost years to make up before 
optimistic Democrat claims about ‘re-establishing climate leadership’ 
will appear credible. Veterans of former US President Obama’s Paris 
negotiating team have been recruited to assist, and will be working hard 
in Glasgow.
Climate economist Nicholas Stern claimed that the delay gave time 
to prepare for a big push at the Glasgow COP towards ensuring that 
rather than propping up business as usual, the massive funds being 
poured into pandemic recovery fund a transition to a sustainable and 
resilient economy (Harvey 2020). Was his optimism realistic? How 
will the new world of post-COVID international relations handle the 
need to co-operate? It is still too soon to say whether Stern’s vision of 
pandemic recovery funds kick-starting a new global economy “in closer 
harmony with the natural world” (Harvey 2020: online) will come 
true, but early signs are not good. While there have been encouraging 
noises from the EU about making sure its COVID recovery plans are 
at least congruent with its NDC targets, there are (as ever) questions 
around whether this rhetoric will be matched by action. Elsewhere, 
many countries have given massive bailouts and loans to airlines and 
fossil fuel companies, without even attaching conditions on improved 
environmental performance (Bailoutwatch 2021; Transport and 
Environment 2020). This financial stimulus risks locking in business-as-
usual for decades to come. Meanwhile, researchers identify a growing 
trend towards ‘cutting green tape’ as politicians accept arguments from 
business that climate-related regulation is hindering economic recovery 
(Bond et al. 2020). This tendency is happening in many countries but 
again the most egregious example has been the US, where the former 
Trump-led Republican administration seized on recovery rhetoric to 
justify its existing plans to rescind or weaken a truly alarming number 
of environmental regulations (Popovich et al. 2020).
The context here was not only climate denial and cronyism (as also 
flagged by Bigger et al. in this volume), but a wholesale repudiation 
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of international agreements of all kinds. Trump withdrew the US not 
only from Paris, but also from numerous other international treaties on 
issues from nuclear arms control, to human rights, to the militarisation 
of space. His administration even quit the World Health Organisation 
in the middle of a pandemic. Clearly, internationalism of any kind 
was firmly off the table and it will not be politically easy to turn this 
supertanker around. It would take a very brave Democrat to stand up 
and say that America is no longer First. 
Meanwhile, varieties of Trumpism live on in countries such as Brazil, 
Australia and India—all major players in climate negotiations. China is 
setting stronger domestic targets, but has never been noted either for its 
multilateralism or for its altruistic stance on global affairs. Despite the 
fall of Trump, this does not appear to be an auspicious time for Paris-
style voluntary co-operation (Sachs 2019).
UK, EU, CO
2
Squirming in the COP26 host’s spotlight will be a UK government 
incongruously obsessed with the idea that the country should make its 
own buccaneering way in the world, beholden to no-one. A desperate 
scramble to sign trade deals with anyone other than the EU led UK 
negotiators to accept that any US/UK deal must not even mention 
climate change (Hannis 2020). Whether this will change under Biden 
remains to be seen. 
As the host of COP26, the UK is expected to set an example, and 
virtue-signalling on climate is also seen as an easy way for a newly 
isolated blond populist to build bridges with the Biden administration. 
Unfortunately, talking up the UK’s climate commitment now takes the 
distinctly Trumpian form of claiming that a clean, high-tech Britain is 
forging ahead of the dirty old EU, not to mention the rest of the world. 
In the proud new era of unchallenged sovereignty, no opportunity 
is missed to make clear that Britain is Best. Even when the UK drugs 
regulator licensed a COVID vaccine created in Germany by a Turkish 
couple, for a US drug company to manufacture in Belgium, puppyish 
cabinet minister Gavin Williamson explained that this proved British 
scientists were “the best in the world”, and that “we’re a much better 
country than every single one of them” (Euronews 2020: online). If 
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still in post, Williamson may perhaps get deployed to Glasgow. His 
breathless, fact-free enthusiasm would be perfect for press releases like 
this:
The UK’s new target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—our Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Climate Agreement—is 
among the highest in the world and commits the UK to cutting emissions 
at the fastest rate of any major economy so far. Today’s target is the first 
set by the UK following its departure from the EU, demonstrating the 
UK’s leadership in tackling climate change (BEIS 2020a: online).
The UK NDC promises to reduce emissions “by at least 68% by 2030, 
compared to 1990 levels”, meaning that “UK emissions per person will 
fall from around 14 tCO2e [tonnes of CO2 equivalent] in 1990 to fewer 
than 4 tCO2e in 2030” (BEIS 2020c: 1, 28). This sounds impressive, but 
most of this reduction has already happened, due largely to the historic 
move from coal to gas power stations between 1990 and 2015 (Thomas 
et al. 2019). The per person figure for 2019 was 5.3 tonnes, so the new 
target in fact proposes a less impressive cut of only around a quarter 
of this amount over the next decade (Evans 2020). The equivalent EU 
target is a cut of 55% by 2030 (Climate Action Tracker 2020). This is 
certainly a lower headline figure than the UK’s proposed 68%, but it 
is also an average across twenty-seven countries facing many different 
challenges. Current EU average per capita annual emissions are around 
6.7 tonnes, and if the 2030 target were met this would reduce to around 
five, meaning that a similar drop of around a quarter from today’s levels 
is envisaged by 2030 (Eurostat 2021). 
Even ten years ahead seems a very long time under present conditions, 
but these 2030 targets are intended as stepping stones towards reaching 
the current holy grail of ‘zero carbon by 2050’, to which both the UK and 
the EU have committed, along with a growing list of other countries. A 
timely measure of how hard this will be is provided by work estimating 
that the dramatic drop in global economic activity caused by the 
pandemic will impact global temperature by no more than 0.01 degrees 
(Forster et al. 2020). 
Oddly, the UK’s NDC announcement carried endorsements from 
banks, energy companies, Tesco and Coca Cola Europe (BEIS 2020a). 
Their enthusiasm may in part be explained by the fact that the NDC 
target does not include any emissions elsewhere in the world, such as 
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those arising from the production of goods for UK consumption, or 
from overseas activities of UK-registered companies. It also excludes 
international aviation and shipping. 
The Return of Article 6
On the face of it, the UK’s NDC does at least commit to achieving 
reductions by actually emitting fewer greenhouse gases, rather than 
by international offsetting or voluntary carbon trading. But perhaps 
inevitably, voodoo carbon economics reappear in the small print:
While the UK intends to meet its NDC target through reducing emissions 
domestically, it reserves the right to use voluntary cooperation under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Such use could occur through the 
linking of a potential UK emissions trading system to another emissions 
trading system or through the use of emissions reductions or removals 
units (BEIS 2020b: 27).
Meanwhile the recent Energy White Paper proclaims in now-familiar 
triumphal tones:
Having left the EU, we are ready to lead the world again. 
We will establish a UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to replace the 
UK’s participation in the EU ETS. [...] the UK is open to linking the UK 
ETS internationally [...] we are considering a range of options, but no 
decision on our preferred linking partners has yet been made (BEIS 
2020c: online).
An unlinked UK ETS would be implausible, and the only realistic ‘linking 
partner’ will be the much bigger EU scheme, so it seems inevitable that 
any UK ETS will effectively become an offshoot of the EU ETS, sharing 
the many flaws of that scheme while having lost the ability to influence it 
(Gabbatiss 2020). Post-Brexit threats to genuine decarbonisation will of 
course come not only from the disingenuous carbon trading facilitated 
by Article 6, but also from old-fashioned physical trade. Importing 
and exporting goods across the world rather than across the English 
Channel is not exactly going to help with reducing carbon emissions. 
More broadly, EU law and oversight have been the key upward drivers of 
UK climate and environmental standards for decades. No-one seriously 
believes that the sacred ‘divergence’ will result in UK environmental 
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standards being higher than those in the EU. But they will be British 
standards, so of course they will be better.
Beware the Bubble
If the retreat from global co-operation continues in Glasgow, one 
outcome might be that Article 6.4’s projected global carbon trading 
mechanism never gets off the ground. As discussed above this might 
well encourage further growth in poorly regulated bilateral offset 
deals under Article 6.2. There are worrying signs that the UK may seek 
to become a hub for brokering such deals, given its stated aspiration 
to “position the UK, and the City of London, as a leader in the global 
voluntary carbon markets” (BEIS 2020d; for background see also 
Mikolajczyk and ‘t Gilde 2020).
There may, however, be a more constructive option, and indeed one 
which should appeal to those sceptical about international co-operation. 
Could failure to achieve a global trading regime encourage the Parties to 
actually take responsibility for their own emissions? Nothing in the Paris 
Agreement stops a country producing an honest NDC based on genuine 
reductions in emissions, with no reliance either on carbon trading or on 
fanciful ‘negative emissions technologies’ (Hannis 2017; Herzog 2018). 
Such honesty would also mean including emissions associated with 
everything the country consumes, no matter where it was produced. The 
Johnson Government has so far shown little interest in work mapping 
out what this could mean for the UK (see, for example, Allwood et al. 
2019; Allen et al. 2019). Genuine leadership at COP26 could start here, 
rather than with attempts to reflate the carbon trading bubble.
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